Analysing Bang & Olufsen's BeoLink Audio/Video System Using Coloured Petri Nets by Christensen, Søren & Jørgensen, Jens Bæk
Analysing Bang & Olufsen's BeoLink
Audio/Video System Using Coloured Petri Nets
Sren Christensen & Jens Bk Jrgensen
Computer Science Department, University of Aarhus
Ny Munkegade, Bldg. 540, DK{8000 Aarhus C, Denmark
E-mail: fschristensen, jbjg@daimi.aau.dk
Abstract. Bang & Olufsen A/S (B&O) is a renowned manufacturer of
audio and video products. Their BeoLink (BeoLink) system distributes
sound and vision throughout a home via a network. In this way, e.g., while
doing the cooking in the kitchen, a person can remotely select and listen
to a track from a CD loaded in the CD player situated in the living room.
To resolve conicts, synchronisation between various actions is needed,
and is indeed taken care of by appropriate communication protocols.
The purpose of the project described in this paper was to test Coloured
Petri Nets (CP-nets or CPN) as a way to improve B&O's methods for
specication, validation, and verication of protocols. In the main ex-
periment, an engineer from B&O used the Design/CPN tool to build a
CPN model of vital parts of BeoLink, to validate its behaviour using
simulations with a familiar graphical feedback, and to formally verify
crucial properties using occurrence graphs (also known as state spaces
and reachability graphs/trees). The latter activity demonstrated the ap-
plicability of occurrence graphs for timed CP-nets. Moreover, CPN was
used to examine important aspects of a possible future revision of Beo-
Link, and to check compatibility between the new and the old version.
Based on the experiments reported in this paper, CPN has been included
in the set of methods for specication, validation, and verication of
future protocols at B&O.
Topics. System design and verication using nets; higher-level net mod-
els; computer tools for nets; experience with using nets, case studies;
application of nets to protocols and embedded systems.
1 Introduction
The Danish company Bang & Olufsen A/S (B&O) has a long tradition for pro-
ducing sophisticated audio and video products. B&O employs 230 developers. 50
of these produce software full-time. Part of the software development deals with
communication protocols. This paper describes a project aimed at improving
B&O's ways of specifying, validating, and verifying communication protocols.
The project was carried out in cooperation between B&O and the CPN group,
University of Aarhus, with participation of the authors of this paper.
A relatively new invention of B&O is the BeoLink concept. A home equipped
with a BeoLink system has a central room, typically the living room, where
audio/video sources such as a radio, a CD player, a cassette recorder, a TV, and
a video recorder are located. The idea is that from the other rooms such as the
kitchen or the children's room, the audio/video sources of the central room can
be controlled and accessed remotely. In this way, there is no need to buy, e.g.,
two CD players. Figure 1 sketches a house with a BeoLink system, which can be
viewed as a number of audio/video devices connected in a network. The gure is
drawn in a Petri net-like style. In this example, there are four devices. Generally,





Fig. 1. A BeoLink system.
The BeoLink concept stipulates synchronisation. Assume, e.g., that a home
has one CD player in the central room. If two persons being in separate rooms
want to listen to dierent tracks at the same time, there is a conict. A commu-
nication protocol is needed to resolve the situation sensibly and gracefully.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of the project. In Sect. 3, the considered vital part of BeoLink, the so-called lock
management protocol, and the CPN model created are outlined. Section 4 intro-
duces a new software library heavily used in this project for graphical feedback
from simulations. Moreover, the section describes the approach to simulation and
the validation results obtained. Section 5 covers how aspects of the CPN model
were formally veried using occurrence graphs. Section 6 describes how CPN
was used to test an idea for a future revision of BeoLink. In particular, compat-
ibility between devices running the old and the new version of the considered
protocol is investigated. Section 7 describes a supplementary CPN experiment
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at B&O. In Sect. 8, the project described in this paper is compared with three
other similar ones. The conclusions are drawn in Sect. 9.
2 Overview of the Project
The project began with intensive CPN training of three B&O engineers who
were not familiar with Petri nets. They attended a six-day course given by the
CPN group, with two days each week over three weeks. Practical application
of CPN was emphasised, more than theoretical and mathematical aspects. The
format was a mixture of lectures and practical exercises using textbook material
from [8].
The rst two days introduced the basic CPN concepts through small toy
examples. Moreover, Design/CPN [10], the editing, simulation, and occurrence
graph analysis tool for CP-nets to be used in the project was presented. About
half the time was spent getting hands-on experience at the computer, modify-
ing and simulating small models. Design/CPN uses the language CPN ML for
declarations and net inscriptions. CPN ML is an extension of the functional
programming language Standard ML [12]. The engineers were experienced C-
programmers, but unacquainted with Standard ML. Therefore, some time was
devoted to an elementary introduction to this language. Also, other examples
on industrial CPN projects were presented to demonstrate the potential of the
method.
The middle two days covered more advanced topics such as hierarchical CP-
nets and CP-nets with time. During the last two days, models of systems chosen
by the engineers were created and simulated. Being able to use the CPN method
and tools on something that is well-known and relevant is an important con-
stituent in a learning activity like this. Two separate CPN projects were initi-
ated. The one that will be referred to as the lock management project, is the main
subject of this paper. It deals with the lock management protocol of BeoLink to
be described in Sect. 3. The other project is briey discussed in Sect. 7.
In parallel with the CPN course for the B&O engineers, the CPN group
learned about the BeoLink concept by reading technical documentation and
getting demonstrations. Subsequently, the CPN group made a rough draft of
a CPN model of the lock management protocol. The model was based upon a
state-event matrix and a ow diagram, extracted from the existing description
of the protocol. This draft model certainly eased the initial discussions with the
B&O engineer who was going to carry out the lock management project. It was
highly valuable to discuss the pros and cons of this concrete proposal.
After the CPN course came a period with close contact between the B&O
engineers and the CPN group. The engineer responsible for the lock management
project spent eight full days within one month at University of Aarhus creating
the rst parts of the CPN model. During these visits, he was working on his own
most of the time. When needed, he was assisted by a person from the CPN group
at the computer. It turned out to be an eective way of getting started with the
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project. After this phase, the engineer was able to work quite independently, i.e.,
with one weekly meeting, in addition to contacts via telephone and e-mail.
The project was organised with a weekly visit by a person from the CPN
group at B&O. This day provided an opportunity to discuss dierent ideas and
to solve technical problems. In addition, there were monthly meetings involving
several people, and with more general agendas. Models, simulation results etc
were presented, reviewed, and discussed; and the directions to take now were
decided.
In total, the project ran eectively for nine months in which the responsible
B&O engineer spent 50% of his time on the lock management project. In chrono-
logical order, the focus of the project was on modelling, on simulation, and on
occurrence graph analysis. Finally there was a phase with a mixture of all three
activities, because a design of a new version of the protocol was undertaken.
Modelling and simulation were, except for the rst month after the initial
CPN course, done by the B&O engineer alone. In contrast, the CPN group par-
ticipated closely in the entire occurrence graph analysis phase. This was caused
by two reasons. First of all, the tool support for occurrence graph analysis of
CP-nets was rather new. Therefore, there was not much experience to draw from
regarding application of occurrence graph analysis to real-world CPN models.
Thus it would be at least dicult, and most likely impossible, for the CPN
group to provide appropriate guidance without being an active participant. Sec-
ondly, this project was seen as an opportunity to test the applied tool which is
developed by the CPN group.
3 Lock Management in the BeoLink
This section rst introduces the lock management protocol of BeoLink. The
corresponding CPN model created is described next.
3.1 The Lock Management Protocol
The lock management protocol is a vital part of BeoLink used to grant exclusive
access to various services. The purpose of the protocol is to prevent disorder,
e.g., that track 11 is selected on a CD if two users simultaneously request track 1.
The protocol manages a key which must be possessed by any device wanting to
execute a function that can alter the audio/video distribution, or is depending on
it. Examples of functions requiring the key are selection of audio/video source,
e.g., switch on a radio or change from radio to CD player; and control of source,
e.g., change of track on a CD. The device possessing the key is called the lock
manager.
Communications in the protocol are initiated by users issuing events. It is apt
to think of a user as a person operating a device, although this is a simplication:
A person does not explicitly request a key. He or she does not even know that
such a thing exists. Instead, e.g., the person wants to change track on a CD, and
this prompts internal actions within a device resulting in communications in the
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lock management protocol. In a similar simplied fashion, an event issued by a
user can be thought of as a press of a button on a remote control.
Figure 2 depicts a typical communication sequence in the lock management
protocol. Only one user is shown, User1who operates Device1. Say that Device1
is a CD player, and that User1 wants to change track. The event key wanted
is sent to Device1, which is not the lock manager. Therefore, Device1 requests
the key on the network by broadcasting a REQUEST KEY telegram (telegram is
B&O's preferred synonym for message). Device3 is the lock manager and is
ready to give away the key. When Device3 sends the KEY TRANSFER telegram to
Device1, the key gets reserved. Device1 is granted the key upon reception of the
KEY TRANSFER telegram, and sends a NEW LOCK MANAGER to Device3 as an ac-
knowledgement of a successful transfer. Finally, User1 gets the event key ready,








Fig. 2. A communication sequence in the protocol.
This is an example of a typical communication sequence, but obviously it
is not a complete description of the protocol. Many cases must be dealt with:
What if the lock manager is not ready to give away the key? What if the key is
already reserved for a third device? What if the key is lost? Creating a formal
executable model of the protocol like it is done in this project provides a sound
basis for answering such questions.
When a BeoLink system starts from scratch, no key exists. The lock man-
agement protocol describes rules ensuring that a key gets generated in the ini-
tialisation phase. It is the obligation of the power master to do so. The power
master is the device delivering electrical current to the data connection of a
BeoLink system. Normally, there is exactly one power master. If there are more,
pathological situations may appear, as we shall see in Sect. 4.2. Also, if the key
is lost in a running BeoLink system, e.g., if the lock manager is turned o, the
power master must ensure timely generation of a new key.
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3.2 The Lock Management Model
The CPN model of the lock management protocol, the lock management model,
consists of 13 pages (also known as subnets and modules). An overview is given


















Fig. 3. The hierarchy page.
The topmost page BeoLink contains a high-level description of BeoLink and
is already shown in Fig. 1 in Sect. 1. Here, the objects Device1 to Device4 and
Network are substitution transitions meaning that their detailed behaviours are
described on subpages (for presentation purposes, Network has a non-standard
graphical appearance). Generally, in Fig. 3 an arc between two nodes indicates
that the page of the source node contains a substitution transition described on
the subpage of the destination node.
Thus a BeoLink system consists of a network and a number of devices. The
network page models the primitives for sending, receiving, and broadcasting
telegrams. In this presentation of the model, there are four instances of the
device page corresponding to four devices in the considered BeoLink system.
The device page models the selected aspects of a device, in particular device
is connected to a description of the lock management protocol: The protocol is
modelled by the page func lock plus all its subpages. In addition, device is
connected to the user page, which models the user of a device that sometimes
wants the key. Each device has its own separate set of page instances. In total,
for a BeoLink system with four devices, the model has 46 page instances.
The model contains colour sets, i.e., types, describing the telegrams. Also,
there is a colour set FL STATE (FL for function lock, a synonym used by B&O
for the lock management protocol) used to represent the state of a device with
respect to the key. The lock manager is either in state KEY FREE or KEY USED,
depending on whether the key can be given away or not. A device which does
not have the key and does not want it either, is in state KEY IDLE. A device
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which has requested the key, but has not got it yet, is in state KEY WAIT. There
are a number of other possible states used for various purposes.
To give an impression of the model, we will now describe two selected pages
at a general level. Not all details are explained.
Page func loc. An extract of the page func loc is shown in Fig. 4. As men-






















Fig. 4. Extract of the page func loc.
All the transitions on func loc are substitution transitions. Hence, there
are no arc inscriptions in Fig. 4 | these details are hidden on subpages. The
transitions correspond to the pages of the rightmost column of the hierarchy
page in Fig. 3. Only ve of the transitions are shown in Fig. 4. The shown
transitions describe how incoming telegrams are handled. The transitions not
shown correspond to the three bottommost pages in the rightmost column of
Fig. 3. Two of these transitions deal with incoming events from users, the third
transition handles timeouts.
In Fig. 4, when a telegram is available on the place recbuf, one of the actions
represented by the transitions handling incoming telegrams can happen. Which
action depends on the telegram. The action represented by such a transition may
produce a telegram on the place sendbuf; may change the state of the device
with respect to the key, i.e., change the marking of the place named fl state;
and it may read and/or set a timer, represented by the place fl timer. The
marking of the config place is used to make various choices. config contains
conguration information for a device, e.g., saying whether a device is power
master or not.
Page reqkey. Now we will describe the reqkey page shown in Fig. 5. It is
subpage for the leftmost transition of Fig. 4.
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[#command tlg = LOCK_MANAGER_COMMAND, 
 #type_ms tlg = REQUEST_KEY,
 outtlg  = 
   send(#from_address tlg, config, LOCK_MANAGER_STATUS, KEY_TRANSFER),
 outtlg1 = 














of KEY_FREE   => [outtlg] 
 | KEY_USED   => [outtlg1]  
 | KEY_TRANS  => [outtlg1] 
 | KEY_TR_SE  => [outtlg1]





of KEY_FREE   => KEY_TRANS  
 | default    => fl_state
fl_state
(case fl_state
 of KEY_FREE => 1‘timer
  | default  => empty)
 @+ TRANS_VALUE
Fig. 5. The page reqkey.
There is only one transition on this page. The transition models the action
taken when a REQUEST KEY telegram is received by a device. In general, there
are three kinds of possible responses: 1) If the receiving device is lock manager
and is ready to give away the key, the response is a KEY TRANSFER telegram sent
to the requesting device. 2) If the receiving device is lock manager but is not
ready to give away the key, the response is a KEY TRANSFER IMPOS telegram sent
to the requesting device. 3) If the receiving device is not lock manager, it does
not reply at all.
We now take a closer look at Fig. 5 and explain how the above rules are
modelled.
A telegram is coming from the topmost place recbuf. To ensure that the
rst telegram received by a device is also handled rst, the colour set of recbuf
is the list type TLG LIST. The reception of a telegram consists in extracting the
rst element of the list, i.e., taking a list matching the pattern tlg::tlg list
from recbuf and returning only tlg list. The operator :: is the basic list
constructor putting its left argument (here, the telegram bound to the variable
tlg) in front of its right argument (here, the list of telegrams bound to the
variable tlg list).
The rst two equations of the (large) guard positioned in square brackets
inside the transition check that the telegram is to be handled here. The commas
in the guard are interpreted as logical conjunction. The rst equation insists that
the telegram concerns the lock management protocol | there are many other
telegrams on the network used for other purposes. The second equation checks
that it is indeed a REQUEST KEY telegram.
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The two remaining equations of the guard are used to construct the response
to be sent on the network. send is a function returning a telegram with an
appropriate sender and receiver composed from the given arguments. Whether
the response is a KEY TRANSFER telegram, a KEY TRANSFER IMPOS telegram, or
nothing at all, can be seen from the guard and the case expression on the
arc going to the bottommost place send buf. The case expression evaluates
to a list with either one or zero elements, which is concatenated to the list of
telegrams already present on sendbuf using the operator ^^. The marking of the
rightmost place fl state is used to determine the response, and may change as
a consequence of the decision made.
If a key transfer is started, a timer is set: A token is put on the place fl timer.
This is done in order to be able to time out if an acknowledgement of a successful
transfer from the recipient of the key does not arrive in due time.
The four other subpages of page func loc for handling incoming telegrams
have the same net structure as reqkey, but dierent guards and arc expressions.
The three subpages for handling user events and time-outs are simpler.
The CPN model described in this section is easily extensible. This is an
important property, because presently, only the lock management protocol of
BeoLink is modelled. It is natural to consider inclusion of other functionalities,
e.g., selection of audio/video source. Selection of a source can be added as an
additional subpage for the device page. In this case, the hierarchy page (Fig. 3)
would appear with another column of pages next to and similar to func loc and
its subpages. The only modication of existing pages would be addition of one
substitution transition to the device page.
4 Simulation
This section rst introduces the concept of message sequence charts that were
used to provide graphical feedback from simulations in a way that is very familiar
to the B&O engineers. The approach to simulation of the lock management
model and the validation results obtained are described next.
4.1 Message Sequence Charts
When discussing behaviour of distributed systems, designers often draw charts
illustrating the message passing between components of the system. Such mes-
sage sequence charts [7] are very useful to capture normal behaviours, and also to
discuss special cases. In fact, the B&O engineers used exactly this kind of charts
when they explained the BeoLink concept and the lock management protocol
for the CPN group in the beginning of this project. We already saw an example
of a message sequence chart in this paper, Fig. 2 in Sect. 3.
The Design/CPN tool includes a recently implemented library [3] supporting
automatic creation of message sequence charts as logs of simulations. Figure 6
shows an example of a message sequence chart from the lock management model.
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Fig. 6. A message sequence chart.
The lock management model is timed. Timed CP-nets are formally dened
in [9], and will be explained in more detail in Sect. 5.1 of this paper. For now it
suces to say that there is a global clock, and it makes sense to speak about the
time of an action. The message sequence chart of Fig. 6 displays the telegrams
sent to the network and the time at which the sending happens. A horizontal
arrow indicates the sender and the receiver. Multi-headed arrows are used for
broadcasts.
Figure 6 shows a snapshot of the initialisation phase, a simulation in the
time interval from 0 to 1648. A time unit in the CPN model corresponds to a
millisecond in the protocol implementation. At time 112, Device4 requests the
key. Shortly after, the three other devices do the same. However, as mentioned
in Sect. 3.1, no key exists in the BeoLink system when it starts from scratch.
Device3 is rst to discover this | at time 1612, it does so by broadcasting a
KEY LOST telegram. Subsequently, both Device2 and Device4 also discover the
missing key and take appropriate action by broadcasting KEY LOST telegrams.
At time 1648, the power master, Device1, nally noties the other devices that
it has generated a key by broadcasting a NEW LOCK MANAGER telegram.
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4.2 Simulation Approach and Results
In the early modelling phase, interactive simulations were used intensively. In
these kinds of simulations, the behaviour of the model is investigated on the level
of the token game. Often, the B&O engineer and a person from the CPN group
sat together at the computer and studied the eect of the individual transitions
in detail in order to get the model right.
After about three months, the lock management model was considered com-
plete. It was now instrumented to create and update message sequence charts.
This consisted in attaching code segments, i.e., pieces of Standard ML code, to
two transitions. A code segment is evaluated when its transition occurs. Quite
often, like here, the purpose is to have a side eect such as an update of a
drawing. From this point, the B&O engineer used almost exclusively automatic
simulations to study the behaviour of the model. In an automatic simulation,
the token game is not displayed and the feedback comes solely from the eects
of code segments. Automatic simulation allows a large number of steps to be
executed in a short time.
At a certain point in the simulation phase, the engineer was convinced that
the model behaved correctly in the normal cases. His next objective was to
validate that it was able to deal with a number of special cases.
A case where an extra key was implanted into the model was simulated. Two
keys may appear in the real world if telegrams are lost, although this occurs
only very rarely. However, the lock management protocol must be suciently
robust to handle such a situation. It indeed turned out to be. Two keys are
merged into one shortly after their appearance. When a lock manager receives
a NEW LOCK MANAGER telegram, it immediately accepts that somebody else has a
key and consequently abandons its own. The real-world eect of two simultane-
ously existing keys could be some noise in a set of loud speakers during a short
time interval, e.g., sound from the radio and the CD player at the same time.
Also, it could be that a press on a button of a remote control is lost.
A BeoLink system installed with a wrong kind of cable may have two power
masters. This case was simulated. If the users of the two devices being power
masters never want the key, an apparently never-ending sequence of regenerating
a key and immediately abandoning it in each of the two power masters may
take place. It is an actual livelock of the protocol. However, it is not critical,
because it can only happen in an incorrectly installed system. On the other
hand, B&O generally strives to make software robust, i.e., not relying too much
on assumptions about proper functioning of the environment. Thus it would
make sense to modify the protocol to be able to deal sensibly with the presence
of two power masters as well. It would even be quite easy to do so.
Another observation from the simulation runs is that the protocol is highly
dependent on the duration of the time periods before a time-out. If time is
switched o in the model | this corresponds to every action happening in-
stantly | the protocol malfunctions. Several keys appear, and no proper lock
management is in eect.
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Except for the last one, the observations above were as expected by the
engineer. He found it very interesting to recognise the real-world behaviour of
the protocol in the CPN model. He believes that if the model had existed before
the implementation, thus allowing experiments with dierent solutions in an
easy and cheap fashion, the protocol would certainly have proted from that.
5 Occurrence Graph Analysis
This section rst contains a general discussion of occurrence graph analysis for
timed CP-nets such as the model of the lock management protocol. The veri-
cation results obtained using the method are described next.
The tool applied was the Design/CPN Occurrence Graph Tool [4] oering
functionalities to generate occurrence graphs, to draw them, and to do queries.
5.1 The Challenge of Applying Timed Occurrence Graphs
An occurrence graph [9] for a CP-net is a directed graph with a node for each
reachable marking and an arc for each occurring binding element1. An arc is
going from the node of the marking in which the associated binding element
occurs to the node of the marking resulting from the occurrence.
The lock management model is timed: Each marking has an associated global
time and some tokens carry time stamps determining when they are ready to
take part in occurrence of transitions. Time stamps are taken into account when
two markings are tested for equality in generation of the occurrence graph. The
global time is as well. Two identical markings existing at dierent global times
are considered dierent. Another way to put it is to say that the global time is
part of the state. Because the global clock advances and the protocol is intended
to run forever, the occurrence graph for the lock management model is expected
to be acyclic and innite. An occurrence graph for a timed CP-net is called a
timed occurrence graph.
If timing aspects were suppressed in the model, there would be a chance of
generating a full occurrence graph. It might very well be huge, but expectedly
nite. Unfortunately, as was noted in Sect. 4.2, timing is essential. Without it,
the protocol malfunctions. Thus the challenge of analysing the original timed
model was faced. The natural question to ask now was: Is it at all possible
to use timed occurrence graphs to derive any formal analysis in practice? As
with simulations, negative results may be obtained. E.g., if one of the markings
encountered during a generation is dead, certainly the considered CP-net has
a dead marking | because it has just been found. Here however, the aim was
to establish positive results, i.e., prove that something works as expected. To
achieve this, before a generation was initiated, we had to carefully decide how to
proceed. It was impossible to encounter all reachable markings. Thus the target
was less ambitious and more specic.
1 A binding element is a pair containing a transition and a binding. The binding assigns
values to all variables of the transition.
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The Design/CPN Occurrence Graph Tool provided help through its function-
ality of branching options. A branching option is a user-dened predicate taking
a state as argument and determining whether successors are generated or not.
A certain generation strategy can thus be enforced by writing an appropriate
predicate.
Figure 7 gives an example of the use of a branching option. The model giving
rise to the gure is a much simplied version of the lock management model only
























Fig. 7. Sketch of a partial timed occurrence graph.
The considered branching option says whether a marking has a key or not
(key/no key). In all the leaves, i.e., all states for which no successors have been
generated, a key is present. Therefore, the generation has stopped and the graph
is partial. We will return to this existence of a key issue for the real lock man-
agement model in Sect. 5.2.
In Fig. 7, next to each node is shown the associated global time2. Another
example of a branching option could be a predicate saying whether the global
time of a state is less than a certain value. This would make it possible to
investigate all behaviours of a model up to a certain global time. If this value is,
say, 1000, in Fig. 7, only the nodes 1, 2, and 3 shown with a thick border, would
be processed during generation.
Having a branching option in eect is often not sucient to yield a usable
partial occurrence graph that can be stored in the memory of the computer
available. In addition, typically the model itself must be adapted to make it
tractable for occurrence graph analysis. In theory, the occurrence graph method
2 The global clock is not necessarily advanced in consecutive steps. After occurrence
of a step, the clock is set to the next moment at which something can happen, i.e.,
time leaps.
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is pleasantly simple: Generate the graph and do the queries. In practice, this is
often a deceit. Even for a system with a nite occurrence graph, because of the
well-known state explosion problem, the graph is typically too big to be stored
in the computer available. Thus a modeller working towards verication using
occurrence graphs must initially consider modication and reconguration of the
model so that there is at least a chance of succeeding.
A necessary modication of the lock management model was to introduce
bounds on the buers used for input and output between the devices and the
network, e.g., the places recbuf and sendbuf on the page reckey shown in
Fig. 5. These buers were unbounded in the model used for simulation, and
starting generation of an occurrence graph for this model would certainly not
be wise. The time may be spent and the memory of the computer lled while
the occurrence sequence, i.e., behaviour, where one device just produced a long
sequence of telegrams in its output buer is being recorded. I.e., there would be
no guarantee at all that usable information was derived.
Generally, when trying to make a CPN model tractable for occurrence graph
analysis, it is often benecial to x small values of possible system parameters.
In the lock management model, the system parameter is the number of devices
on the BeoLink system considered. However, as we shall see below, the (par-
tial) occurrence graphs generated for the four devices system, which has been
considered throughout this paper, are, with the chosen branching options, of a
manageable size. Thus in this case, it was not needed to decrease the chosen
system parameter.
5.2 Occurrence Graph Analysis Results
First, the part of the lock management protocol taking care that a key is gen-
erated when a BeoLink system starts from scratch was veried. It was formally
proved that no matter what happens during this initialisation phase, the system
always reaches a state where a key exists.
By means of the key/no key branching option illustrated in Fig. 7, an oc-
currence graph for the entire initialisation phase was generated. It was of a very
manageable size and generated within a short time. For the four devices system,
there was 13,420 nodes and 41,962 arcs. To get more results than just for the
four devices system, the B&O engineer augmented the model with a new exible
mechanism to turn devices on and o, and thus conveniently experiment with
dierent numbers of devices. For each case, it was veried that the occurrence
graph was acyclic, and that all terminal nodes corresponded to markings in which
a key exists. This means that in a nite number of steps, eventually a marking
where a key is present will be reached. Moreover, the minimum and maximum
times to reach a marking in which the key is generated were found. For the four
devices system, the minimum was 1600 and the maximum 2000. As mentioned
previously, these measures are in milliseconds. Thus the analysis showed that it
takes between 1.6 and 2.0 seconds before a key is generated. These times are in
accordance with the times known from the real world, i.e., the actual times it
14
takes from power is switched on until a BeoLink system is ready. This indicates
that reliable performance measures are indeed derivable from the CPN model.
The next natural step in the formal verication of the model was to try to
verify that at all times, there is at most one key. Of course, it was not possi-
ble to do it the straightforward way because the occurrence graph was innite.
Instead, the lock management model was partially veried as follows: An occur-
rence graph containing all occurrence sequences, i.e., behaviours of the system,
within one key transfer was generated. The initialisation phase had already been
veried. Thus it was safe to initialise the model to already have a lock manager
before the occurrence graph generation was started. A branching option was in-
stalled expressing that there is a new lock manager, i.e., the key is transferred to
one of the other devices. It was interesting to check, e.g., that there were no dead
markings, and that the bounds on places were as expected. For four devices, the
graph had 2,578 nodes and 5,335 arcs. An intuitive appealing idea is to use this
experiment as basis in a proof of total correctness using mathematical induction
in the number of key transfers. Unfortunately, when the key is transferred once,
the system may be in several dierent states. In fact, it turned out that there
were too many cases to make the approach usable in practice. However, even
though this experiment did not serve as a total verication of the protocol, the
condence in its correctness was strongly increased.
6 Next Revision of BeoLink
This section describes an experiment made alone by the engineer responsible
for the lock management project. He wanted to use CPN to solve a recurring
compatibility problem within the company. Each year, B&O releases a new series
of products. Under the very reasonable assumption that the typical customer is
not willing to replace his or her expensive audio/video system in total at one
instant, new and old devices must be able to co-exist. A radio some years old,
and a brand new TV installed by the dealer yesterday, must be able to function
together in the same BeoLink system without causing communication problems.
Therefore the engineer wanted to design a possible future revision of the
lock management protocol, and ensure that a BeoLink system with a mixture of
devices running the new and the old protocol will have a proper lock management
in eect. Without having an executable model of the protocol, a proposal for a
new version, and in particular its compatibility with the old one, is cumbersome
and expensive to try out. In practice, an implementation must be done before
any testing can take place.
In the design of the new protocol, the concept of a power master is abandoned.
Instead, there is now a video master and/or an audio master. The video master
has the obligation and the right to generate a new key, immediately when it
discovers that none exists. Under the same condition, the audio master may
generate a new key, but only after some time period has elapsed. This asymmetry
between the masters is introduced to ensure that only one key is generated. If
they both respond immediately, there is a high risk of two keys appearing.
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The CPN model of the new protocol was created by the engineer without
support from the CPN group. At this stage, the engineer was fully capable of
working with the CPN method and tools all by himself. It took only about
two weeks (four weeks half-time) to design the new protocol, and to create and
investigate the corresponding CPN model. In the original model, described in
Sect. 3.2, new versions were created of four of the pages modelling the protocol,
i.e., some of the subpages of the page func loc (see Fig. 4). New substitution
transitions were added accordingly to func loc. A exible conguration mecha-
nism was created, making it possible to vary the mixture of new and old devices
without changing the structure of the model itself. When the engineer presented
the results of his eorts for the CPN group, the behaviour was conveyed using
message sequence charts. Many simulation runs had been done, including de-
tailed investigation of ve cases corresponding to dierent congurations with
new/old devices and presence of video/audio masters. The simulations conrmed
that the new protocol is indeed sensible. In the rst place, a BeoLink system
with all new devices work as expected. Secondly, and equally important, new
and old devices do co-exist without problems.
In addition to simulation, the model including a mixture of new and old
devices was formally veried using occurrence graphs in the same way as the
original model. The same ve cases as considered using simulation, were investi-
gated again. The work was done by the engineer alone. Being now experienced
in this activity, it took only about half a day.
7 The CD Protocol | A Supplement
The lock management project was the main experiment in B&O's investigation of
CPN. As an independent supplement, the CD project was carried out in parallel.
Here, the CD protocol describing rules for communication between two processes
internal to a so-called interactive CD was studied. The protocol is documented
as prose text and adheres to the 7-layer OSI model. All other layers but 1, 2,
and 7 are empty. The CD protocol is quite dierent from the lock management
protocol.
In an intricate way, the CD protocol governs communication between two
processes. These processes are not symmetrical. Reception of messages has pri-
ority over transmission of messages in one of the processes. This means that if
this process is engaged in transmitting a message, and it detects that it has an
incoming message waiting, it must immediately switch to receiving. The inter-
rupted transmission must subsequently be resumed. The other process cannot
be interrupted in any activity.
The aim of creating a CPN model was to investigate properties like data
transmission reliability and collision handling. In comparison with the lock man-
agement project, only a small eort was invested. Nevertheless, it resulted in a
sensible 9-page model. There was no attempt to do occurrence graph analysis.
Simulation was done on the level of the token game. The project never got to a
phase where a more appropriate way of representing the results of simulations
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was implemented, such as using message sequence charts in the lock management
project. Anyway, using simulation, the responsible B&O engineer discovered a
bug in the design of the CD protocol. It was related to the situation where a
switch from transmission to reception was forced. The bug did not cause the
protocol to malfunction, but it did decrease its performance. It turned out that
the programmer responsible for the implementation actually recognised this bug.
But it had rst been found late in the test phase, and it had been very convenient
to have xed it earlier.
According to the engineer who carried out the CD project, if the protocol
was about to be implemented now, the CPN model would have provided a basis
for writing better and simpler code.
In addition to investigating CPN for specication, validation, and verication
at B&O, a small experiment was made to test the feasibility of CPN to document
communication protocols. Presently, B&O has good methods for documenting
the static parts of protocols, e.g., the involved telegrams/messages and states.
However, better ways of documenting the dynamics of protocols are pursued as
well. As an attempt, the CPN model of the CD protocol was connected with
a textual description of the protocol via a hypermedia application [6] support-
ing organisation of information from many sources using cross references. This
allowed easy navigation between the textual description of a part of the pro-
tocol and the corresponding location in the CPN model. In this way, the CPN
model served as an integrated supplement to the existing documentation of the
protocol.
8 Related Work
In this section, the project described in this paper, referred to as the B&O
project, is compared with three other similar ones recently documented in the
literature.
Philips Audio Protocol. In [1], the formal verication of an audio protocol
from Philips is described. The protocol focuses on low-level data transmission,
much like the CD protocol. It species rules for exchange of control messages
between processes within a certain audio device. The model created is a timed
automata which is veried using the model-checking tool UPPAAL [2]. The prop-
erties established are formulated as temporal logic formulas. As an example, it
is proved that the receiver only receives messages that are actually transmitted.
[1] has many similarities with the B&O project. Both are attempts of research
groups to test approaches and tools for systems specication and verication
within a large company producing audio/video systems. A notable dierence
is that the modelling and verication described in [1] was carried out by the
authors, i.e., by the research group. In the B&O project, most of the work was
done by the B&O engineers. The CPN group was merely consultants. This was a
deliberate choice which we see as a success. We learned that it is possible, within
a reasonable time frame, to teach CPN including occurrence graph analysis to
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engineers from the industry, enabling them to apply the method themselves. An-
other dierence is that [1] focussed exclusively on formal verication. In addition
to that, the B&O project included validation using simulation, an activity highly
appreciated by the B&O engineers.
Modelling using CPN is quite similar to programming in a high-level lan-
guage. This competence is obviously wide-spread in the industry, providing a
good starting point for introducing CPN in other companies as well. With respect
to formal verication using occurrence graphs as applied in the B&O project,
the underlying mathematics is hidden for the user. The interface to generation,
drawing, and querying of the Design/CPN Occurrence Graph Tool makes it
possible to take advantage of the method without knowing the details of its the-
oretical foundation. We cannot judge how easy it is to understand the ideas of
timed automata and temporal logic, although we do believe that it does require
a rather strong mathematical background.
Alarm Systems. The small Danish company Dalcotech has successfully been
using CPN for the design of a new alarm system as documented in [11]. This
project and the B&O project were organised the same way: First came a phase
with initial CPN training for the engineers, and initial model drafts made in
close cooperation between the company and the CPN group. It continued with a
long phase where the engineers worked relatively independently. Dalcotech and
B&O share many conclusions on the CPN projects carried out. However, Dal-
cotech takes a more dramatic step and introduces CPN as a general development
method for all future designs of alarm systems. B&O already uses SA/SD [13]
as the main development method. A lot of resources have been invested in ed-
ucation of the B&O engineers, and SA/SD serves its purposes well. Thus B&O
never had the intention to base all their development activities on CPN. Also,
the Design/CPN tool lacks version control and proper support for multiple users
working on the same project, obstructing optimal large-scale use in a company
like B&O. Use of the current version of the tool, e.g., by 15 engineers working
together on producing software for a new TV, would be awkward.
Network Gateways. Another recent industrial application of CPN and De-
sign/CPN is described in [5]: The design of a gateway between radio networks
and broadband integrated services digital networks within the Australian De-
fence Force. Of particular interest in this project is the fact that occurrence
graphs were applied in an industrial environment. Quite similar to the B&O
project, occurrence graphs were used to verify basic behaviours of a CPN model,
not to do a total verication of the full model.
9 Conclusions
Towards the end of the project described in this paper, the involved B&O engi-
neers wrote a status report for their managers. Here they summed up the goals
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and the results obtained. The goal of using CPN was to improve the methods
for specication, validation, and verication of protocols. The main conclusion
of the status report is that the goals were met. Being able to create executable,
formal models is recognised as a valuable basis for obtaining better results faster.
Many industrial modelling and simulation projects using Petri nets have been
documented in the literature over the years. Thus, it is important to make clear
what the contribution of this paper is for the research area of Petri nets. Did we
learn anything new?
We learned that it is possible to convey the CPN method in a relatively short
time to make it usable for industrial engineers in a way so that they are able
to work independently. The hardest part for the B&O engineers was to cope
with Standard ML. As experienced C-programmers, they were used to think in
terms of an imperative language, and the shift to a functional language turned
out to involve some diculties. A lot of the consultancy work of the CPN group
consisted in assisting with Standard ML tasks.
We learned that application-specic graphical feedback from simulations
is highly important. The B&O engineer responsible for the lock management
project relied heavily on the new support for message sequence charts in De-
sign/CPN. It made his work both more pleasant and more ecient. Moreover, it
enabled the engineer to discuss results of simulations with colleagues unfamiliar
with CPN.
We learned that it is possible to introduce a formal analysis method, oc-
currence graphs, in an industrial company. It was demonstrated that timed oc-
currence graphs can prove really useful, also to derive positive formal analysis
results.
B&O's interest in this project was explained by the fact that communication
protocols are gaining increasing attention within the company. Today, BeoLink
oers access to sound and vision throughout a home using traditional audio and
video sources. B&O anticipates that its products will be used more and more to
disseminate information in general in the home, e.g., via access to the Internet.
Proper communication protocols are essential to achieve good results in this
area. Based on the project described in this paper, B&O has concluded that
CPN can be a useful aid in this process.
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